This paper examines and evaluates a range of methodologies that have been proposed for making useful claims about the probability of phenomena that would contribute to existential risk. Section One provides a brief discussion of the nature of such claims, the contexts in which they tend to be made and the kinds of probability that they can contain. Section Two provides an overview of the methodologies that have been developed to arrive at these probabilities and assesses their advantages and disadvantages. (...) Section Three contains four suggestions to improve best practice in existential risk assessment. These suggestions centre on the types of probabilities used in risk assessment, the role of methodology rankings including the ranking of probabilistic information, the extended use of expert elicitation, and the use of confidence measures to better communicate uncertainty in probability assessments. Finally, Section Four provides an annotated literature review of catastrophic and existential risk probability claims as well as the methodologies that were used to produce each of them. (shrink)

This paper examines and evaluates a range of methodologies that have been proposed for making useful claims about the probability of phenomena that would contribute to existential risk. Section One provides a brief discussion of the nature of such claims, the contexts in which they tend to be made and the kinds of probability that they can contain. Section Two provides an overview of the methodologies that have been developed to arrive at these probabilities and assesses their advantages and disadvantages. (...) Section Three contains four suggestions to improve best practice in existential risk assessment. These suggestions centre on the types of probabilities used in risk assessment, the role of methodology rankings including the ranking of probabilistic information, the extended use of expert elicitation, and the use of confidence measures to better communicate uncertainty in probability assessments. Finally, Section Four provides an annotated literature review of catastrophic and existential risk probability claims as well as the methodologies that were used to produce each of them. (shrink)

My thesis demonstrates that, despite a number of impossibility results, a satisfactory and coherent theory of population ethics is possible. It achieves this by exposing and undermining certain key assumptions that relate to the nature of welfare and personal identity. I analyse a range of arguments against the possibility of producing a satisfactory population axiology that have been proposed by Derek Parfit, Larry Temkin, Tyler Cowen and Gustaf Arrhenius. I conclude that these results pose a real and significant challenge. However, (...) in the absence of further evidence I reject the conclusion that they imply that the value of populations is either not precise or not transitive. Instead, I expose some fundamental assumptions behind these results. One key assumption is that something can only make a life better or worse if it makes that life better or worse for the person living it, i.e. it raises or lowers the ‘welfare level’ of that life. Although intuitively highly plausible, this assumption ignores the possibility that perspectives other than that of the person living a life may be relevant for evaluating the components of that life and that these should be incorporated into our all things considered judgements. I argue that episodes within a person’s life that are strongly psychologically connected may have a special normative significance, particularly if these episodes involve such things as the enjoyment of ‘the best things in life’ or the experience of great suffering. We have reason to assign an all things considered value to such strongly psychologically connected phases of a person’s life, where this value is not exhausted by the contributions these make to the welfare level of that person’s life as a whole. It follows that our all things considered evaluations of populations are often underdetermined by information about the welfare levels of the lives they contain. However, in certain cases, most notably in that of ‘the Repugnant Conclusion’, there is nevertheless sufficient information provided by the welfare levels of persons’ lives to allow us to infer facts about these components that make an all things considered difference to these evaluations. I argue that a failure to acknowledge these facts is the cause of the aforementioned impossibility results and that once they are taken into account it is possible to produce a satisfactory theory of population ethics. (shrink)

This paper examines and evaluates a range of methodologies that have been proposed for making useful claims about the probability of phenomena that would contribute to existential risk. Section One provides a brief discussion of the nature of such claims, the contexts in which they tend to be made and the kinds of probability that they can contain. Section Two provides an overview of the methodologies that have been developed to arrive at these probabilities and assesses their advantages and disadvantages. (...) Section Three contains four suggestions to improve best practice in existential risk assessment. These suggestions centre on the types of probabilities used in risk assessment, the role of methodology rankings including the ranking of probabilistic information, the extended use of expert elicitation, and the use of confidence measures to better communicate uncertainty in probability assessments. Finally, Section Four provides an annotated literature review of catastrophic and existential risk probability claims as well as the methodologies that were used to produce each of them. (shrink)

If cooperative dispositions are associated with unique phenotypic features (’green beards’), cooperative individuals can be identified. Therefore, cooperative individuals can avoid exploitation by defectors by cooperating exclusively with other cooperative individuals; consequently, cooperators flourish and defectors die out. Experimental evidence suggests that subjects, who are given the opportunity to make promises in face-to-face interactions, are indeed able to predict the partner’s behavior better than chance in a subsequent Prisoners’ Dilemma. This evidence has been interpreted as evidence in favor of (...) green beard approaches to the evolution of human cooperation. Here we argue, however, that the evidence does not support this interpretation. We show, in particular, that the existence of conditional cooperation renders subjects' choices in the Prisoners’ Dilemma predictable. However, although subjects predict behavior better than chance, selfish individuals earn higher incomes than conditional cooperators. Thus, although subjects may predict other players’ choices better than chance evolution favors the selfish subjects, i.e., the experimental evidence does not support the green beard approach towards the evolution of cooperation. (shrink)

There is no agreement about the supplement at the end of the first line. almost certainly refers to marriage, discussion of which is postponed till something becomes black or turns dark. Theiler's hardly fits thecontext, and Burkert's with the sense ‘when the grapes ripen’ is not convincing. A metaphorical sense for ‘grapes’ is preferable, e.g. or, better,,, ‘when youwill be old enough to marry’; but the phrase comes with a jolt in the absence of any preparation or immediate follow-up: (...) in the passages of Philodemus andHorace quoted as parallel by Ebert-Luppes the metaphor is not simply a singleword but is extended over two or three lines. (shrink)

There is no agreement about the supplement at the end of the first line. almost certainly refers to marriage, discussion of which is postponed till something becomes black or turns dark. Theiler's hardly fits thecontext, and Burkert's with the sense ‘when the grapes ripen’ is not convincing. A metaphorical sense for ‘grapes’ is preferable, e.g. or, better, , , ‘when youwill be old enough to marry’; but the phrase comes with a jolt in the absence of any preparation or (...) immediate follow-up: in the passages of Philodemus andHorace quoted as parallel by Ebert-Luppes the metaphor is not simply a singleword but is extended over two or three lines. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 25.2 (2001) 353-356 [Access article in PDF] Book Review The Metaphysical Club The Metaphysical Club, by Louis Menand; xii & 546 pp. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001, $27.00. "They didn't just want to keep the conversation going; they wanted to get to a better place" (p. 440). So much for the most prominent contemporary pragmatist, Richard Rorty, who remains unmentioned except (...) in the acknowledgments. That better place is participatory democracy (a phrase that does not appear in the book), which "means that everyone is equally in the game, but it also means that no one can opt out" (p. 441). The true name of the game is skeptical tolerance. There are no unquestionable duties or inalienable rights, no immutable natural laws, no absolute moral rules, no highest principles, no inherent virtues, no absolute standards, no stasis, no absolutely certain truth. There are no individual destinies, because the social comes before the individual, and the individual is embedded within and cannot exist without society. Scientific knowledge is always probabilistic, not necessarily because nature is indeterministic, but because we can never know enough to calculate its regularities if they exist. To wit, there are no Platonic Ideas or unchanging universals. All is change, nothing that happens is ever repeated, our general ideas and laws of nature are merely tools for getting along in the world. Above all, ideas do not refer to things, only to other ideas. What expedites our thinking is true. What expedites our acting is right. Whenever we act according to principle, rule, or law, we are making a bet that events will turn out the way [End Page 353] we think they will. If we keep this always in mind, we will never succumb to violence or war in the name of belief or principle. Whatever we believe, it could be otherwise. Such is a general summary of pragmatism as it has filtered down to the textbooks. It is (again befittingly) more or less accurate. The can-do American seeks out cash value in practical life.Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., William James, Charles Saunders Pierce, and John Dewey crafted the only indigenous philosophy that has so far been produced in America. Its roots are in Laplacean probability theory, Darwinian evolutionism, and Chauncey Wright's indeterminism. While James hoped to save a place for religion (if it works, go with it) and Pierce a place for God (he thought there had to be a designing intelligence to account for order), the pragmatic result is profoundly skeptical and secular. Neither Holmes nor Dewey thought that individuals imbedded in societies had any need of absolutes. Holmes said that people first decide on the basis of experience, then they deduce. Dewey said that people first behave commonsensically, then they rationalize.There is nothing as condensed as the above in Louis Menand's beautiful book on the ideas, personalities, and influence of Holmes, James, Pierce, and Dewey. I know of no clearer exposition of their ideas, and few biographers have made them come so alive. In particular, Menand's coverage of peripheral (but by no means insignificant) figures is very rich. He describes the development of graduate universities in America in detail from their autocratic beginnings to the institution of academic freedom as we know it today. University presidents, trustees, and administrators are presented luxuriously as the villains, and the professors gloriously as the heroes. Menand remarks with slight amazement that society bought the concept that professors were beholden to the public at large and not to the state or private university owners. He could have commented further on the fact that the concept of academic freedom has become virtually irrelevant in today's corporate research universities."It is a remarkable fact about the United States," Menand begins his book, "that it fought a civil war without undergoing a change in its form of government" (p. ix). This is a breathtaking fact, and I don't suppose Menand had any intent to explain it. "The Civil War swept away the slave civilization of the South, but it swept away almost the whole intellectual... (shrink)

Meta-analytic results show that board gender diversity is modestly associated with firm performance, but there is notable heterogeneity among findings. Board gender diversity allows access to women’s perspectives, potentially helping boards, but diversity can also trigger biases that exclude women directors, such that boards do not integrate meaningful perspectives. Addressing this problem, we leverage the categorization-elaboration model, contact theory, and critical mass theory to build new theory as to how men directors can serve as allies to women directors to (...) class='Hi'>better leverage diverse perspectives. We empirically test how considerations that reduce out-group categorization and bias against women moderate the board gender diversity-firm performance relationship. Our results show that gender diverse boards perform better with more formal contact among men and women director colleagues, and that gender diverse boards with more men directors who only have prior experience working with token-women, perform worse. Our work helps explain how and why board gender diversity can improve or detract from firm performance. This extends the literature by illustrating the important consequences that occur when firms do (or do not) have men directors who are likely to be allies of gender diversity. (shrink)

Annotation. There has never been a writer quite like Christopher Pearson. A BETTER CLASS OF SUNSET brings together Pearson's enduring columns and essays, chronicling the twists and turns of Australian cultural life over three intriguing decades. From climate change to homosexuality and the welfare of Indigenous Australians, Pearson was an unflagging champion of unfashionable causes, a conscientious objector to political correctness and a skilled dissector of muddle-headed arguments. They reveal a true man of letters with a rare literary voice; (...) passionate, moving and often very funny, Pearson's thinking seldom strays from his abiding principles. For all those who aspire to be members of what Pearson called Club Sensible, A BETTER CLASS OF SUNSET is an indispensible addition to the bookshelf. (shrink)

In the 1870s, microscopy societies began to proliferate in the United States. Most of these societies attracted microscopists from surrounding cities, but the American Postal Microscopical Club, modelled on the British Postal Microscopical Society, used the postal system to connect microscopists scattered across the country. Club members exchanged microscope slides and notes following a chain-letter system. The main objective of the club was to teach its members how to make permanent slides. Preparation and mounting methods required technical (...) skill, which was, as even club members had to admit, difficult to learn without personal instruction. Yet members developed ways to share craft knowledge through the post. Drawing on the private notes of a member and published reports on the slides circulated, this paper challenges the widespread assumption that the generation of craft knowledge depended on the co-location of artisans. It argues that microscopists’ knowledge of preparation methods was intertwined with their skill in building and navigating information infrastructures, and that by tracing these infrastructures we gain a better understanding of how craft knowledge travelled in the late nineteenth century. (shrink)

Prominent accounts of collective intentional activity explain the nature of social groups by virtue of a specific criterion: goal-directedness. In doing so, these accounts offer little in the way of determining whether there are any differences among social groups. In this paper, I propose a refined framework of collective intentional activity that can distinguish among social groups better than alternative accounts, and which has revisionary but nevertheless plausible implications for the nature of the family: specifically, that certain friendship relationships (...) may count as genuinely familial, and that we ought to count them as such. I argue that social groups are distinguished by what we can expect from one another within different kinds of social groups; specifically, that there is an important difference between reciprocity that is equivalent in performance and reciprocity that is equivalent in intention; familial groups are specifically guided by this latter kind of reciprocity. This more inclusive definition of familial groups may have important implications for how such groups are supported within a given society – for instance, by recognizing certain caring relations as essential for well-being and supporting them accordingly. (shrink)

This article attempts to show points of contact between current analytical philosophy and the philosophy of Bernard Lonergan. It does so by focusing on the philosophy of logic. Debates concerning the adequacy and/or completeness of the various logical systems which have been or are being elaborated are an important aspect of analytical philosophy today. Lonergan was also preoccupied with the foundations of logic. This is manifest not only in his 1957 Boston College lectures on the subject, but throughout his philosophical (...) writing. In the article we shall see how Lonergan's cognitional theory can throw light on issues in the philosophy of logic which are of importance to analytical philosophers. The discussion, which will be non-technical in nature, will examine contemporary debates on the principles of excluded middle and non-contradiction, and will also focus on Lonergan's unique contribution to a philosophical analysis of both the importance and the limitations of symbolism in philosophical argument. /// O presente artigo pretende mostrar a existência de pontos de contacto entre a Filosofia Analítica corrente e o pensamento de Bernard Lonergan. Em ordem a isso, o autor do artigo concentra a sua atenção na filosofia da lógica. Com efeito, os debates acerca da adequação e/ou completude dos vários sistemas lógicos já elaborados ou em processo de elaboração constituem um importante aspecto da Filosofia Analítica mais recente. Por seu lado, Bernard Lonergan também se preocupou com os fundamentos da Lógica. Isso é o que se pode ver não apenas mediante as suas conferências pronunciadas no Boston College em 1957 acerca desta matéria, mas ao longo de todos os seus escritos filosóficos. Neste sentido, o artigo pretende sobretudo demonstrar de que modo a teoria cognitiva de Lonergan pode projectar luz sobre diversos problemas candentes em filosofia da lógica, problemas esses que são de grande importância para os filósofos analíticos. Esta discussão, que aqui se apresenta sem recorrer a procedimentos técnicos, examina os debates contemporâneos acerca dos princípios do terceiro excluído e de não-contradição, chamando especialmente a atenção para o contributo de Lonergan para a análise filosófica quer da importância quer dos limites do simbolismo na argumentação filosófica. (shrink)

An introduction to the contemporary epistemology and philosophy of histography of Bernard Lonergan. A comparative analysis of Lonergan's perspective on objectivity in historical knowledge, perspectivism, and the deconstructionist approaches of metahistorians. Beards argues the relevance of Lonergan's contributions to current debates.

First published in 2005. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

In this paper, we argue that our moral concern for future well-being should reduce over time due to important practical considerations about how humans interact with spacetime. After surveying several of these considerations (around equality, special duties, existential contingency, and overlapping moral concern) we develop a set of core principles that can both explain their moral significance and highlight why this is inherently bound up with our relationship with spacetime. These relate to the equitable distribution of (1) moral concern in (...) a universe that we can only causally affect in one temporal direction; (2) access to the benefits from using spacetime as a resource; and (3) the burdens of care given (1) and (2). We conclude by considering the practical implications of our argument and find that, while it is often assumed that a preference for present over future well-being weakens the case for existential risk mitigation, this likely is not the case. (shrink)

The Repugnant Conclusion and its paradoxes pose a significant problem for outcome evaluation. Derek Parfit has suggested that we may be able to resolve this problem by accepting a view he calls ‘Perfectionism’, which gives lexically superior value to ‘the best things in life’. In this paper, I explore perfectionism and its potential to solve this problem. I argue that perfectionism provides neither a sufficient means of avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion nor a full explanation of its repugnance. This is because (...) even lives that are ‘barely worth living’ may contain the best things in life if they also contain sufficient ‘bad things’, such as suffering or frustration. Therefore, perfectionism can only fully explain or avoid the Repugnant Conclusion if combined with other claims, such as that bad things have an asymmetrical value relative to many good things. This combined view faces the objection that any such asymmetry implies Parfit’s ‘Ridiculous Conclusion’. However, I argue that perfectionism itself faces very similar objections, and that these are question-begging against both views. Finally, I show how the combined view that I propose not only explains and avoids the Repugnant Conclusion but also allows us to escape many of its paradoxes as well. (shrink)

On certain plausible views, if humanity were to unanimously decide to cause its own extinction, this would not be wrong, since there is no one whom this act would wrong. We argue this is incorrect. Causing human extinction would still wrong someone; namely, our forebears who sacrificed life, limb and livelihood for the good of posterity, and whose sacrifices would be made less morally worthwhile by this heinous act.

Over the past decade, interest in human enhancement has waxed and waned. The initial surge of interest and funding, driven by the US Army’s desire for a ‘Future Force Warrior’ has partly given way to the challenges of meeting operational demands abroad. However the ethical opportunities provided by soldier enhancement demand that investigation of its possibilities continue. Benefits include enhanced decision-making, improved force capability, reduced force size and lower casualty rates. These benefits — and enhancement itself — carry concomitant risks, (...) including morale issues due to tension between enhanced and unenhanced soldiers, the issues of enhanced veterans and ownership of enhanced bodies, challenges to the army’s core values and personal identity issues. A range of measures should be designed to highlight the opportunities offered by enhancement while also minimising the potential risks. This includes providing advice on which areas the army ought to demonstrate restraint in research for ethical reasons. (shrink)

According to Luck egalitarians, fairness requires us to bring it about that nobody is worse off than others where this results from brute bad luck, but not where they choose or deserve to be so. In this paper, I consider one type of brute bad luck that appears paradigmatic of what a Luck Egalitarian ought to be most concerned about, namely that suffered by people who are born to badly off parents and are less well off as a result. However, (...) when we consider what is supposedly unfair about this kind of unequal brute luck, luck egalitarians face a dilemma. According to the standard account of luck egalitarianism, differential brute luck is unfair because of its effects on the distribution of goods. Yet, where some parents are worse off because they have chosen to be imprudent, it may be impossible to neutralize these effects without creating a distribution that seems at least as unfair. This, I argue, is problematic for luck egalitarianism. I, therefore, explore two alternative views that can avoid this problem. On the first of these, proposed by Shlomi Segall, the distributional effects of unequal brute luck are unfair only when they make a situation more unequal, but not when they make it more equal. On the second, it is the unequal brute luck itself, rather than its distributional effects, that is unfair. I conclude with some considerations in favour of this second view, while accepting that both are valid responses to the problem I describe. (shrink)

This is the first complete theory of the morphology of language, a compendium of information on morphological categories and operations.

In the article ‘After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?’ arguments are made in favour of the moral permissibility of intentionally killing newborn infants, under particular conditions. Here we argue that their arguments are based on an indefensible view of personhood, and we question the logic of harm and interest that informs their arguments. Furthermore, we argue that the conclusions here are so contrary to ordinary moral intuitions that the argument and conclusions based upon it—including those which defend more mainstream (...) methods of abortion—should be treated with immediate suspicion. (shrink)

Generally speaking, just war theory (JWT) holds that there are two just causes for war: self-defence and ‘other-defence’. The most common type of the latter is popularly known as ‘humanitarian intervention’. There is debate, however, as to whether these can serve as just causes for preventive war. Those who subscribe to JWT tend to be unified in treating so-called preventive war with a high degree of suspicion on the grounds that it fails to satisfy conventional criteria for jus ad bello; (...) – particularly the just cause and last resort criteria. Francisco di Vitoria held that the only just cause for war was ‘a wrong received’, which renders impossible any justification for preventive war. There are assumptions implicit in recent military practice, however – most notably, the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 – that challenge this ban on preventive war. Interestingly, both supporters and critics attempt to justify their views through the broader logic of JWT; viz., through a conception of what is good for both political communities and individuals, and through a legitimate defence of these goods. Supporters point to situations where so-called rogue states represent ‘grave and imminent risk’ of committing acts of aggression as grounds that justify preventive war; critics argue that to attack another political community on the basis of crimes not yet committed is a breach of the very rights JWT was created to defend. The advocate of preventive war does not appreciate important aspects concerning the morality of war. In the ongoing tension between Iran and The United States and her allies – if the rhetoric is to be believed – I am asked to tolerate a threat to my security and liberty, and to risk suffering aggression in defence of the rights of the antagonistic, but not yet aggressive, state. The crucial question is how such tolerance and risk fit in with the logic of just war: at what point, if any, does the risk of being attacked become great enough to justify declaring war in anticipation? In this paper I highlight some of the theoretical and practical difficulties in determining what counts as a grave and imminent threat, focusing especially on the complicated case of ‘imminence’ in the face of so-called ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’. Secondly, I will argue that not only is the notion of preventive war inconsistent with the defence of the rights of political communities that JWT requires; it is also forbidden by the proportionality requirement of jus ad bellum. A risk of being subjected to aggression is the price for global peace. Whilst political communities can do much to prevent aggression and prepare themselves in case it occurs, the conditions for just war require that this prevention and preparation stop short of declaring war. We must live with a certain degree of risk in this area. (shrink)

This essay explores the archive of a 1971 interview of Angela Davis by Swedish journalist Bo Holmström—recorded in Santa Clara County Jail where Davis awaited trial—to examine the relationship between Black radical thought and its social and intellectual mediation, especially when it comes to questions of violence versus nonviolence. Where Holmström invokes the “violence/nonviolence” binary in the interview, Davis pointedly resists its distortions, restoring the record of contemporary and historical conditions of racial terror that both necessitate and criminalize Black self-defense. (...) Decades later, the interview was filtered through the violence/nonviolence binary in editing for the acclaimed 2011 documentary, The Black Power Mixtape 1967-1975, with Davis’s wider conversation with Holmström not only abridged but remixed into a shorter exchange on armed self-defense. Studying the interview from its conditions of possibility through its later remixing, and reading it together with her opening defense statement (1972) and later speeches and writings, the essay excavates and explicates Davis’s original theoretical interventions and indexes a cluster of forces that mediate Black radical thought, Black women’s radical thought more specifically, and prison texts. The final section historicizes Davis’s theorization of the spatial and relational contexts of Black self-defense in Dynamite Hill, Alabama, and in California, and contends that her incisive interventions into the violence/nonviolence binary in 1971 remain critical here and now. (shrink)

Elizabeth Anscombe (1919–2001) was a significant figure in twentieth-century philosophy. Her work is characterized by the attempt to retrieve and deploy some of the insights of Aristotle and Aquinas in the light of the philosophical perspectives of her mentor, Ludwig Wittgenstein. Bernard Lonergan was also a twentieth-century thinker concerned to retrieve and develop perspectives from the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition in the context of modern and post-modern thought. This article attempts to initiate a critical dialogue between the thought of these two philosophers. (...) Anscombe’s philosophical views on topics such as self-knowledge, conscious intention, and the foundations of ethics are discussed and critically evaluated. The article also includes a critical reappraisal of the celebrated debate between Anscombe and C. S. Lewis. (shrink)